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AN OPEN LETTER FROM ONE BLACK SCHOLAR TO
JUSTICE RUTH BADER GINSBURG: OR, HOW NOT TO
BECOME JUSTICE SANDRA DAY O'CONNOR
JEROME MCCRISTAL CULP, JR.*
I am writing to you to begin a more effective public discussion on race.
I do so in this form' as a way to challenge you to think more carefully
about racial issues than your colleagues have in their time on the bench. The
efforts of the current Justices can, in the main, be characterized as see no
evil, hear no evil, and evil. I believe there is a need for the public discussion
I hope to provoke; too much of our intellectual discourse about race does
not take place in public.2 More importantly, I am asking you not to take the
path blazed by your gender predecessor, Justice Sandra Day O'Connor. Not
* Professor of Law, Duke University School of Law. Thanks to Adrienne Davis and to
my research assistant Frank Cooper for his help.
1. For the prior use of this form, see A. Leon Higginbotham, Jr., An Open Letter to Justice
Clarence Thomas From a Federal Judicial Colleague, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 1005 (1992). I thought that
Open Letter from the most senior black judge in the federal system to one of the least senior
black judges in the federal system made several extremely useful points. I am not a woman,
nor can I claim any particular status that provides me with the right to speak for any group
of black people or particular academic community. However, I believe that some of the issues
I raise in this Letter are at the heart of much of the discussion I have heard made by both
majority scholars and scholars of color. I hope that my Letter raises those concerns in an
effective manner.
2. President Clinton's withdrawal of Professor Lani Guinier's nomination to be Assistant
Attorney General for Civil Rights is just one example of the insistence that discussions about
race be suppressed. Black people who raise the uncomfortable are seen as radical or out of
the mainstream. See Jerome McCristal Culp, Jr., Water Buffalo and Diversity: Naming Names and
Reclaiming the Racial Discourse, 26 CONN. L. REV. 209 (1993). To insist on the continued impor-
tance of race in America is to subject oneself, whether black or white, to invective-even
from feminists. See Derrick A. Bell and Linda Singer, Comment, Making A Record, 26 CONN. L.
REV. 265 (1993); Paul D. Carrington, Comment, Buffaloes and a Straw Man, 26 CONN. L. REV.
295 (1993). See also T. Alexander Aleinikoff, The Constitution in Context: The Continuing Signifi-
cance of Racism, 63 U. COLO. L. REV. 325, 328-330 (1992) (arguing that courts should not ig-
nore the racism that continues to haunt the experience of Black Americans in housing, educa-
tion, voting, and other areas of life); Suzanna Sherry, The Forgotten Victims, 63 U. COLO. L.
REV. 375 (1992). According to Sherry, Aleinikoff ignores the real victims in soci-
ety-women-and their continued oppression:
Aleinikoff, in his eagerness to empathize with the victims of racism, completely
overlooks the victims of sexism. Similarly, his description of the young black man
who felt resentful when a woman with a baby crossed the street to avoid him natu-
rally invites a comparison: he fears for his emotional well-being, but she fears for
her physical safety. I, at least, would rather be snubbed than raped.
Id. at 375. Sherry's description of this problem shows the difficulty that some important femi-
nists display with respect to issues of racism-she would compare the relatively small risk of
being raped with the certainty of snubbing every black male she sees. She does not compre-
hend racial oppression because for her, the only oppression worth worrying about-whether
in her law school or in the marketplace-is against white women.
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only is Justice O'Connor deaf and blind to the concerns of Black Ameri-
cans-she has in significant ways added her voice to form a working majori-
ty on the Court in favor of a return to a form of nineteenth century white
supremacy3 in our judicial discourse on race. I hope this Letter will provoke
public discussion, elicit responses, and contribute to the creation of a climate
where the important issues about race are not ignored by the Court or the
Academy. I raise the issue of public discussion in a Letter to you particular-
ly because your nomination sparked discussions about diversity4-although I
do not mean to imply that'your nomination was either required, or limited,
by diversity. We in the legal Academy and in the courts have not signifi-
cantly discussed how much race or other "diversity" concerns ought to mat-
ter, or how such concerns are most appropriately addressed. I hope this
Letter will help to make such a discussion easier.
Two caveats should be stated at the beginning. First, I do not know
how the appropriately race-sensitive Supreme Court Justice would rule in all
cases. There is obviously a range of racially sensitive choices that permit
room for social change. The issue I raise about the current Court and Justice
O'Connor, however, is about adopting a position that leaves the concerns of
black people and other racial minorities without any effective outlet. The
Court has said, in essence, that black people cannot complain about the
racial status quo, and that law and governmental policy will not be part of a
response to racial concerns. I do not, of course, require an oppression
essentialism-by oppression essentialism I mean a requirement that, because
you have suffered gender oppression, you must always reach some particu-
lar result in gender or race discrimination cases-of you or of Justice
O'Connor. Indeed, the central point I want to make in this letter is that
oppression and subordination are both the same and different across culture,
race, gender, and sexual orientation.5 Second, I want to emphasize that I am
3. By white supremacy I mean the view shared by a majority of white people through
most of history that their interests ought to dominate the special concerns of Black Americans
and other people of color. See, e.g., The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 25 (1883) ("there must
be some stage ... when [a black man] ceases to be the special favorite of the laws ... ").
The assertion that no group should receive particular attention or assistance in the pursuit of
universal fairness ignores the fact that we all act with the weight of both historical privilege
and burden behind us. The playing field is not equal and cannot be made so merely by
ignoring the reality of history and starting anew. Dominance of the view I term white su-
premacy means that, whenever issues arise that concern race, the perspectives of white Amer-
icahs will dominate, and the concerns of Black Americans will be ignored. In that sense Black
Americans are different than other factions in the American Constitutional edifice. Black
Americans are never supposed to prevail when their interests are in direct conflict with those
of white Americans. Black Americans are a special faction fated to have their interests subor-
dinated to those of whites in constitutional disputes.
4. You raised the issue of diversity yourself in the speech you gave at your swearing-in
ceremony for the Supreme Court. See infra text accompanying note 67.
5. Some will criticize my recitation of this litany of social constructions as being "politi-
cally correct." I would respond to that criticism in three ways. First, different kinds of social
constructions have always determined the issues that legal scholars and legal participants
worry about. The nature of slavery and freedom were important social constructions that had
legal consequences in the beginning of the nineteenth century. See A. LEON HIGGINBOTHAM,
JR., IN THE MATrER OF COLOR: RACE AND THE AMERICAN LEGAL PROCESS (1978). Notions of
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not commenting on all aspects of Justice O'Connor's jurisprudence or sug-
gesting that race can or should determine every Supreme Court decision.
Justice O'Connor, I am sure, has been helpful and perhaps even innovative
in other areas of the law, but her jurisprudence of race has been particularly
dismissive of the concerns of black people. It is only this aspect of her histo-
ry that this Letter asks you to reject.
Justice O'Connor could have been the one introduced by President
Clinton with these words instead of you:
As a brilliant young law school graduate, she became an early victim of
gender discrimination, when as a woman and mother, she sought nothing
more than that which every one of us wants-a chance to do her work. She
met this challenge with character and determination.6
Like you, Justice O'Connor is married to an influential member of the bar7
With respect to class and race, both of you come from the privileged end of
our society. Privilege does not mean that the holder cannot hear the voices
of the oppressed, but it does suggest that one possessing such privilege
ought to take care to examine where she is in relation to others and where
she and others are going. Racial and gender oppression are both different
and the same. This duality means that understanding, or even partial under-
standing, of one form of oppression does not mean that one will or can
understand the other! Such understanding is required if racial justice and
equality are to be achieved in the near future.
"class" had a legal consequence that led the first post-constitutional Congress to enact as its
first bill a law that included a requirement that judges pledge to do justice to the rich and to
the poor alike. This enactment of an old principle indicated that the implication of wealth
was a social construction of great importance in the late eighteenth century. Second, the social
constructions I have chosen are important determinates of social and legal position in current
society and therefore we ought to pay attention to them. There are no other social construc-
tions that are as important in our current society. Third, by singling these constructions out,
including race, I do not mean to create a category outside history or analysis, or to make a
claim of race essentialism.
6. Ruth Bader Ginsburg Sworn In As Supreme Court Justice (CNN television broadcast, Aug.
10, 1993).
7. I hope it is clear that I reference your husband not to limit you or to make you
responsible for his actions but to ask you to examine where you are in the social hierarchy.
8. Consider, for example, the following statement by Suzanna Sherry:
Donald Trump's ill-advised statement (although when has Donald Trump ever
behaved advisedly?) that well-educated blacks have an advantage is labelled "incred-
ible," but one need only look at affirmative action at work in academia to recognize
the kernel of truth in Trump's conclusion. In both admissions and hiring, blacks
have a significant advantage over whites with equal credentials .... In hiring, virtu-
ally every academic institution has hired minority candidates who lack many of the
academic credentials required of white candidates under traditional standards of
excellence. Moreover, under the law of supply and demand, minority scholars are
often paid more than whites of similar seniority and ability. ...
I will point out simply that at least blacks have achieved formal equality-a
necessary prerequisite to substantive equality, but one which women still lack. There
is currently no government activity, no right of citizenship, no employment or edu-
cational status that can be denied on the basis of race. All legal barriers to racial
equality have been removed by Congress or the courts.
Sherry, supra note 2, at 376-377 (emphasis added).
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This letter has three parts. In Section One, I will examine the equality
framework that you have advocated for reviewing gender differences. My
analysis will demonstrate that your equality model has problems when used
to address the racial status quo-I contend that it is likely to reinforce exist-
ing modes of racial inequalities. I want to challenge you to think about
whether an equality model will work in racial settings, and to contend that
it may also not work when applied to the intersection of race and gender. In
Section Two, I will look at the history and opinions of Justice Joseph P.
Bradley, who I think is the closest historical analogue to you in his appoint-
ment to the Court. Justice Bradley came to the Court as an outspoken advo-
cate of racial justice. He, in fact, prodded his colleagues on occasion about
their failure to understand and deal with racial inequality. Ultimately, how-
ever, he developed a model of racial oppression and justice that left Black
Americans outside the protection of the law. I will argue that Justice
Bradley's opinions and votes helped to create the racial jurisprudence that
ended the first Reconstruction, and that this jurisprudence is strikingly simi-
lar to the jurisprudence of Justice O'Connor. Her jurisprudence is likely to
help to effectively end the second Reconstruction. In Section Three, I will
discuss the way that Justice O'Connor has used and abused racial difference
in her jurisprudence and suggest that her approach of looking for the mid-
dle course is not likely to achieve racial justice. Sometimes justice requires
an understanding that a fundamental program of change is required. Courts
may not always be in the best position to determine the exact nature of that
change, but they do have a responsibility to permit some change. Failure to
permit change causes courts to become the engines of injustice rather than
those of justice. Justice O'Connor's jurisprudence fails to permit change.
1. RACE, THE COURT, AND THE STATUS Quo
In your confirmation hearings you discussed your view of judging,9
and in a recent article you suggested that you thought that the concerns of
gender inequality, including those of abortion, could best be ameliorated
through application of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment." In both of these statements you suggest a view of the status quo of
change that may be inadequate for looking at issues involving, race. For
Black Americans the status quo all too often seems inappropriate. The expe-
rience of Black Americans, unlike that of white women, too often has not
progressed in a uni-dimensional way. Derrick Bell, among others, has docu-
mented the tragic situation for Black Americans." Race is still a large mark-
er for success in our society, more so than class or other indicators of social
position. When race, class, and gender interact, the synergy produces many
of the social problems of America. Blacks still earn less than whites, and
when they seek employment or seek to buy an automobile there are still
9. Confirmation of Ruth Bader Ginsburg as Supreme Court Justice, 1993: Hearing of the Senate
Judiciary Committee, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. 54-55 (1993).
10. See Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Speaking in a Judicial Voice, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1185, 1198-
1206 (1992).
11. DERRICK A. BELL, FACES AT THE BOTTOM OF THE WELL (1992).
Volume 1:21 1994
OPEN LETTER 25
significant differences in the way that they are treated. 2 Blacks get poorer
treatment in the American medical system 3-- even before the Clinton medi-
cal plan centralizes and controls the costs associated with being black and
poor. The irreconcilable element in the arguments of those who support our
current status quo is that there is little evidence that current trends are mov-
ing us toward solving these racial differences.
There are several ways of approaching the racial status quo; not all are
equally sensitive to the differences and the sameness of race. Historically, the
Court has assumed that racial problems will be solved by the evolutionary
forces in the world. This view is one of the central tenets of the legal Acade-
my, and it is wrong. Such a view of history and of progress is at the center
of liberal versions of legal analysis. The liberal celebration of the law argues
that law will lead us inexorably to an "appropriate" society. According to
this liberal view of law, the legal system, as represented in our Constitution
and the common law, is a careful balancing of justice. Historically, it
achieved justice as much as was possible given the constraints of former
times. The assertion is that law today does as much as possible to achieve
justice given present imperfections; the direction of law in the future is to-
ward a situation where the existing constraints will be removed as we
achieve justice.
Yet the decisions in Dred Scott, 4 The Civil Rights Cases," Plessy v.
Ferguson,6 McCleskey v. Kemp,'7 Florida v. Bostick,"8 and Shaw v. Reno 9
12. See Ian Ayres, Fair Driving: Gender and Race Discrimination in Car Negotiations, 104
HARV. L. REV. 817 (1991).
13. Ian Ayres, Laura G. Dooley, & Robert S. Gaston, Unequal Racial Access to Kidney
Transplantation, 46 VAND. L. REV. 805 (1993) (asserting that black people do not have equal
access to transplants). See also J. Michael Soucie, John F. Neylan, & William McClellan, Race
and Sex Differences in the Identification of Candidates for Renal Transplantation, 19 AM. J. KIDNEY
DIS. 414 (1992) (showing that black dialysis patients are less likely than white dialysis patients
with similar health risks to be placed on a transplant list).
14. 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857) (asserting that black men have no rights that white men
are bound to respect).
15. 109 U.S. at 25, supra note 3.
16. 163 U.S. 537, 548 (1896) (holding that "the enforced separation of the races" does not
violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment).
17. 481 U.S. 279, 314-19 (1987) (finding a claim that racial bias has tainted capital sentenc-
ing process insufficient to obviate the death penalty because of the broader social implications
such a finding would have in other areas of the law).
18. 501 U.S. 429 (1991) (refusing to examine the racial context of stops of black men on
buses in search of drugs and concluding that there was no constitutionally inappropriate
coercion and Florida's per se rule incorrectly interprets the United States Constitution).
19. 113 S.Ct. 2816 (1993) (holding that white plaintiffs challenging the composition of a
congressional district make out a prima facie case of discrimination when they claim that a
map is so unusual that it could only have been drawn for racial reasons). Justice O'Connor
incorrectly compares the plaintiffs' plight in Shaw v. Reno with that of Gomillion v. Lightfoot,
364 U.S. 339 (1960). The grotesque 28-sided figure drawn in Gomillion was intended to exclude
all but four or five black citizens and none of the white citizens of Tuskegee. In Shaw, none
of the white citizens were similarly disenfranchised and the power of the white community
was not in any way improperly impeded. Indeed, the only injury to the white citizens is
having to participate in a district that has a small black majority. Justice O'Connor also ar-
gues that somehow there has been an injury to the ability of white (and presumably black)
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demonstrate that the Court can move us away from racial justice for long
periods of time. More importantly, our legal history does not support the
argument that law is always a force for good. This liberal view of law-and
of its present, history, and future-is a celebration of a legal process that is
incongruent with the real legal history of black people in this country.
It may be necessary for judges to engage in this celebratory rhetoric to
perform their constitutional function. I do not believe this to be true, but
even if I am wrong, it is still clearly dangerous for Supreme Court Justices
to believe the rhetoric. Too strong a belief in this rhetoric is a prescription
for total governmental inaction. Nothing in the Constitution-properly un-
derstood-requires such a program. Nothing in our history supports a view
that such a prescription is fair.
In your Article on judicial voice, you suggest that the role of judges is
to facilitate a conversation among legislators." You suggest Roe v. Wade"1
may have been wrong because it truncated a conversation that legislators
were having about abortion.' You argue that the issue of abortion would
be less politically divisive if the Court had based its decision in Roe on more
limited grounds-equal rights for women.' We will never know whether
you are right that such gradualism would have worked. I suspect that there
are many radical changes that could have been made by constitutional fiat
that would not have produced a large scale reaction. For example, I do not
believe that we would be facing a large scale political movement surround-
ing an interpretation of the Equal Protection Clause to require no-fault di-
vorces. Such a policy is probably unnecessary and may also be bad constitu-
tional analysis, but it is not more or less correct because it is not gradual or
because it does not require a conversation with state or federal legislators.
Further, your suggestion that Brown v. Board of Education" is the excep-
tion that proves the general rule that gradualism is necessary to avoid politi-
cal divisiveness 25 seems to me to misinterpret the promise and importance
citizens to participate in a more race-neutral system, but she does not explain what that
would really look like. See Jerome McCristal Culp, Jr., Intersectionality of Oppression: Policy
Arguments Masquerading as Moral Claims, N.Y.U. L. REV. (forthcoming Fall 1994).
20. You note:
The ball, one might say, was tossed by the Justices back into the legislators'
court [in Struck v. Secretary of Defense], where the political forces of the day could
operate. The Supreme Court wrote modestly, it put forward no grand philosophy;
but by requiring legislative reexamination of once customary sex-based classifications,
the Court helped to ensure that laws and regulations would "catch up with a
changed world."
Roe v. Wade, in contrast, invited no dialogue with legislators. Instead, it
seemed entirely to remove the ball from the legislators' court. In 1973, when Roe
issued, abortion law was in a state of change across the nation....
No measured motion, the Roe decision left virtually no state with laws fully
conforming to the Court's delineation of abortion regulation still permissible.
Ginsburg, supra note 10, at 1204-05 (citations omitted).
21. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
22. Ginsburg, supra note 10, at 1205.
23. Id. at 1199-1200.
24. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
25. Ginsburg, supra note 10, at 1206.
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of Brown. You suggest that the Court's decision in Brown reversing Plessy v.
Ferguson' was the result of a long, well thought-out political campaign to
culminate with reversal of the "separate but equal" interpretation of the
Constitution.27 You assert that this reversal was necessary because "pros-
pects in 1954 for state legislation dismantling racially segregated schools
were bleak."' You point out that a critical difference between the situations
addressed by Roe and Brown is that women are, in most instances, the life
partners of men, and that women raise daughters and sons, but black people
were confined by law to a separate sector where they could not disprove the
unreality of biased opinions.29 This argument seems to me to prove too
much. The court in Brown could have started a simpler and more popular
conversation in legislatures about actually providing separate but equal sta-
tus to schools. A gradualist approach would have been less acrimonious and
would have avoided the emergence of political forces in both political par-
ties-forces that have helped to elect every nonincumbent Republican presi-
dent since that time, and have created a minor political force inside the
Democratic party for cutting back the requirement of racial justice.
Your desire for conversations among people will only work in a world
where we know what we are to have a conversation about. There is no
extrinsic way to decide what those things ought to be. The Congress has
engaged in a conversation with the Court that has progressively limited the
reproductive opportunities available to poor women.3 First, the Court did
not require the government to provide abortion services to poor women
unable to afford medical care,3 then the Court permitted federal adminis-
trators to limit access to information to poor women who were the beneficia-
ries of government largess,32 and finally the Court permitted state legislators
to limit effective access of poor women to abortion services.3 The state leg-
islators and congresspersons involved did not display much appreciation for
the hardships these progressive decisions imposed on poor women. The very
conversation you wanted has taken place, but without the effective input of
the poor women and black women who are the unfottunate victims of this
conversation's results.'
26. 163 U.S. 537 (1836).
27. Ginsburg, supra note 10, at 1207.
28. Id. at 1206.
29. Id.
30. See Dorothy E. Roberts, Rust v. Sullivan and the Control of Knowledge, 61 GEO. WASH.
L. REV. 587 (1993).
31. Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980).
32. Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173 (1991) (allowing an administrative interpretation of a
statute to prohibit doctors who received federal dollars from mentioning abortion even if
asked).
33. Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 112 S.Ct. 2791 (1992)
(finding constitutional state restrictions that substantially increase the cost of abortion, thus
effectively limiting access).
34. See Dorothy E. Roberts, Punishing Drug Addicts Who Have Babies: Women of Color,
Equality, and the Right of Privacy, 104 HARV. L. REV. 1419 (1991); Kimberle Crenshaw, Mapping
the Margins: Intersectionality, Identity Politics, and Violence Against Women of Color, 43 STAN. L.
REV. 1241 (1991).
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The problem with Roe is not the lack of a conversation, but the nature
of the conversation that was created-the conversation failed to challenge the
status quo that disempowered poor and black women. We can create lots of
conversations about race that will not challenge the status quo. The very
nature of the Brown opinion, however, did challenge the fundamental as-
sumption of inferiority that underlay the Plessy regime and had supported
the racial status quo. Brown's power comes from the conversations it elimi-
nates as well as the ones it creates. Judicial voices that do not understand
this important point are bound to help recreate an unsatisfactory status quo.
II. JUSTICE JOSEPH P. BRADLEY: MODEL LIBERAL
We are likely to repeat the racial history of the Supreme Court if we do
not understand how that racial history was created. Justice Bradley's ap-
pointment to the Supreme Court in many ways parallels yours. The eldest
son of twelve children born on a small farm in upstate New York, Justice
Bradley was a prodigy whose teachers, first in a country school and eventu-
ally at Rutgers, saw his potential and encouraged his progress-the Rutgers
faculty allowed him to complete his degree in less than three years.' He,
like you, was brilliant. Despite his modest background, he was able to
achieve much as a dedicated member of the bar representing largely railroad
and other corporate interests.' Justice Bradley was appointed to the Su-
preme Court by President Grant in 1870, along with Justice William Strong.
The appointments of Justices Bradley and Strong followed the Senate's rejec-
tion of Ebenezer R. Hoar and the death of Edwin Stanton shortly after he
received confirmation.
At the time of his appointment, Justice Bradley clearly represented the
best in the liberal tradition with respect to race. He spoke out vigorously
against racial oppression in some of his earliest opinions. His dissent in
Blyew v. Kentucky 7 is illustrative. The majority ruled that the Reconstruction
Era civil rights statute which prohibited discrimination against black people
in the courts could not be extended to permit the federal courts to take
jurisdiction of a case involving the ugly racial murder of a black woman
where the only witnesses, black people, were prohibited from testifying by
state law because of their race.' The majority said that this would make
any case that remotely involved black people subject to federal jurisdiction,
and that could not have been what Congress meant when they passed the
Civil Rights Act." In addition, the majority pointed out that the real injury
was to the dead woman, who was not prohibited from testifying by the
Kentucky statute. Justice Bradley wrote eloquently in dissent:
35. See generally CHARLES FAIRMAN, HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED
STATES VOLUME VI, PART ONE: RECONSTRUCTION AND REUNION 1864-1888, at 722-38 (1971).
36. See id. at 724-25.
37. 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 581 (1871) (Bradley, J., dissenting).
38. Id. at 593.
39. Id. at 592.
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The civil rights bill (passed April 9th, 1866, and under which the in-
dictment in this case was found and prosecuted) was primarily intended to
carry out, in all its length and breadth, and to all its legitimate consequenc-
es, the then recent constitutional amendment abolishing slavery in the Unit-
ed States, and to place persons of African descent on an equality of rights
and privileges with other citizens of the United States. To do this effectually
it was not only necessary to declare this equality and impose penalties for
its violation, but, as far as practicable, to counteract those unjust and dis-
criminating laws of some of the States by which persons of African descent
were subjected to punishments of peculiar harshness and ignominy, and
deprived of rights and privileges enjoyed by white citizens . . .'
To deprive a whole class of the community of this right, to refuse their
evidence and their swom complaints, is to brand them with a badge of
slavery; is to expose them to wanton insults and fiendish assaults; is to
leave their lives, their families, and their property unprotected by law. It
gives unrestricted license and impunity to vindictive outlaws and felons to
rush upon these helpless people and kill and slay them at will, as was done
in this case. To say that actions or prosecutions intended for the redress of
such outrages are not "causes affecting the persons" who are the victims of
them, is to take, it seems to me, a view of the law too narrow, too technical,
and too forgetful of the liberal objects it had in view. If, in such a raid as I
have supposed, a colored person is merely wounded or maimed, but is still
capable of making complaint, and on appearing to do so, has the doors of
justice shut in his face on the ground that he is a colored person, and can-
not testify against a white citizen, it seems to me almost a stultification of
the law to say that the case is not within its scope.4'
Justice Bradley understood when he wrote his dissent two years after joining
the Court that it was possible to interpret the Constitution to protect black
people, and that sometimes it was important to do so. When he dissented in
Blyew, Justice Bradley believed the protections of the Constitution should be
vigorously enforced. A few years later, however, his view would change.
In The Civil Rights Cases, decided twelve years after Blyew, Justice
Bradley wrote for an eight Justice majority that black people should at some
point stop being "the special favorite[s] of the laws."42 His opinion indicat-
ed a belief that federal laws designed for the protection of freed slaves could
not protect the "social rights of man and races in the community; but in-
stead existed only to declare and vindicate those fundamental rights which
appertain to the essence of citizenship, and the enjoyment or deprivation of
which constitutes the essential distinction between freedom and slavery." 3
One of the cases in The Civil Rights Cases was brought by Robinson and
Wife against the Memphis & Charleston Railroad to protest the railroad's
refusal to permit the wife to ride in the ladies' car because she was a person
of African descent. The plaintiffs appealed a jury verdict for the defendant
railroad on the ground that the judge improperly admitted evidence showing
40. Id. at 595, 596.
41. Id. at 599.
42. 109 U.S. at 25.
43. Id. at 22.
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that the wife "was an improper person, because she was in company with a
young man whom [the railroad] supposed to be a white man, and on that
account inferred that there was some improper connection between them." '
Writing for the majority, Justice Bradley concluded that the Constitution did
not permit the federal government to provide protection for purely private
wrongs that were not attempts to create badges and incidents of slavery in
violation of the Thirteenth Amendment." Free Blacks had suffered similar
disabilities before slavery, and the purpose of excluding Blacks from public
accommodations had been to ensure that slaves could not run away. The
exclusion no longer served its original purpose; therefore, the exclusion at
issue was not an attempt to create badges and incidents of slavery and was
not constitutionally within the power of the Congress to prohibit.
Justice Bradley, who in Blyew had dissented from the Court's failure to
look at the reality created by a statute prohibiting the testimony of black
citizens, failed twelve years later to examine the similar reality created in the
intersection of race and gender in the case presented by Robinson and his
wife. Because Robinson could "pass" for white and his wife could not, the
Court concluded that the assumption of disrepute was not a badge and
incident of slavery. However, if every black woman not obviously in the role
of servant can be presumed to be a prostitute, has not the Court then indi-
rectly condoned a badge of inferiority for black women directly linked to
slavery? Justice Bradley does not examine that possibility. In addition, he
assumes that whatever rights are available to citizens because of their citi-
zenship will be available and protected by the state courts. Rather than en-
gaging in a meaningful look at reality, Justice Bradley blithely asserts that
any discrimination in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment would be
reachable by appropriate legislation.
Justice Bradley's jurisprudence left black people with few substantive
protections from the vagaries of private racial oppression. Unlike law stu-
dents today, he had to know the decisions like those in The Civil Rights
Cases would leave blacks in most parts of the country subject to severe
forms of racial oppression. After all, Justice Bradley had participated in the
commission that confirmed the election of President Hayes, and he knew
that the compromise that removed protection for blacks in the South would
be a significant impediment to change in the racial status quo." The real
problem with Justice Bradley's interpretation of the Thirteenth and Four-
teenth Amendments was that he permitted the creation of a legal structure
that he knew would not allow any alteration in the racial status quo. I do
not know whether a more vigilant Court would have been able to prevent
the creation of the racial status quo that came about with the creation of the
Jim Crow system. It is clear, however, that the Court, in a manner consistent
with its limited constitutional function and power, could have required the
initiators of a more oppressive racial status quo to abide by the limitations
44. Id. at 5.
45. See id. at 17-18, 20-21.
46. See generally Douglas L. Colbert, Challenging the Challenge: Thirteenth Amendment as a
Prohibition Against the Racial Use of Peremptonr Challenges, 76 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 128 (1990).
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imposed in the legal protections for black citizens created in the aftermath of
the Civil War by Civil Rights statutes. If Justice Bradley had taken the op-
portunity to examine the real creation of badges and incidents for black
women that at least one of the cases provided, the Court could have made
the creation and maintenance of one hundred years of racial oppression a
little more difficult. Instead, Justice Bradley helped to cut off the possibility
of any legal redress for black citizens for more than three generations.
Justice Bradley was convinced that his narrow reading of the Recon-
struction Era civil rights statutes was a necessary realization of the reality of
that times. However, the truth is that he came to see his role as judge to
require that he act as insurer of the status quo-even a racially unfair and
inappropriate status quo. Like you, he had been appointed to the Court by a
"racially" sensitive president to provide some necessary careful thinking. He
brought his brilliance and concern to the Court, but he allowed himself to
use that brilliance to help create a racially restrictive reality for Black Ameri-
cans. Justice Bradley was moderate and "reasonable", but he was not just to
Black Americans.
III. JUSTICE SANDRA DAY O'CONNOR AND RACE
Justice O'Connor was appointed by a racially conservative President as
a direct result of a campaign pledge to provide some gender diversity on
the Court. She has rejected the notion that it is possible to discover a gender
essentialist perspective for women judges.47 However, she has seemed to
want to be sensitive to the concerns of racial minorities." Justice O'Connor
has adopted what she has termed a moderate view on what has become an
increasingly conservative court. She has approved some forms of affirmative
action, and has spoken eloquently about the nature of racial oppression. 9
Justice O'Connor has written powerfully about the discrimination she per-
sonally experienced as a very successful graduate of Stanford Law School in
an era when being a women was almost an absolute bar to being involved
in corporate law. Unfortunately for Black Americans, she has also been a
linchpin in the creation of an effective majority on the Court that would
limit the ability of any level of governmental or private entity to change the
racial status quo.
47. See Sandra Day O'Connor, Portia's Progress, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1546, 1553 (1991).
48. With respect to the concerns of racial difference, Justice O'Connor has commented:
Batson, in my view, depends upon this Nation's profound commitment to the ideal
of racial equality, a commitment that refuses to permit the State to act on the prem-
ise that racial differences matter .... We ought not delude ourselves that the deep
faith that race should never be relevant has completely triumphed over the painful
social reality that, sometimes, it may be. That the Court will not tolerate
prosecutors' racially discriminatory use of the peremptory challenge, in effect, is a
special rule of relevance, a statement about what this Nation stands for, rather than
a statement of fact.
Brown v. North Carolina, 479 U.S. 940, 941-2 (1986) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
49. See, e.g., Johnson v. Santa Clara Transportation Agency, 480 U.S. 616, 647 (1987)
(O'Connor, J., concurring) (approving affirmative action under Title VII for women).
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Gerry Spann has noted that we ought to have limited expectation about
the power of courts to provide change.' However, there is a difference be-
tween not helping change and being an active barrier to the possibility of
change. In our governmental system there are five possible avenues for
change. First, we can have federal legislation to provide effective remedies
for the existing status quo. The legislative program of the last thirty years
has been significantly concerned with attempts to alter the status quo: The
Civil Rights Acts of 1964"' and 1991,52 the Fair Housing Act of 1968,' and
the Voting Rights Act of 1965' and its reenactment in 1982"5 are examples
of efforts in this area. Second, we can have state legislation to remedy with-
in state borders the status quo. Our federalist system means that the possi-
bility of state legislation is an important avenue for change. States have been
on the forefront of some changes in the existing racial situation through both
state law and local ordinances designed to alter the racial status quo. Third,
the President can use his executive power to enforce the principle of anti-
discrimination embedded in the Fourteenth Amendment. Presidents Roose-
velt, Kennedy, Johnson, and Nixon all used that authority to address ele-
ments of racial discrimination.' Fourth, the courts can limit forms of racial
oppression; your Court has on a limited number of occasions provided such
support.57 Fifth and finally, some issues are left to the private activities of
individuals and are outside the purview of governmental action. Some of the
change that has occurred in the last fifty years was the direct result of pri-
vate parties attempting to remedy discrimination.
In four of these areas Justice O'Connor has helped to create a jurispru-
dence that will not permit change in the racial status quo. Justice O'Connor
has been the leader in attempting to interpret Title VII of the Civil Rights
50. See GIRADEAU A. SPANN, RACE AGAINST THE COURT passim (1993).
51. 42 U.S.C. §2000a-h (1981, Supp. 1992). The Act was substantially amended in 1972.
Pub. L. 92-496 (1972) (codified in 42 U.S.C. §1975a-e (Supp. 1994)).
52. Pub. L. No. 102-166 (1991) (codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C. (Supp. 1992)).
53. 42 U.S.C. §3601-31 (1988).
54. 42 U.S.C. §1971-74 (Supp. 1994).
55. Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1982, Pub. L. 97-205 (1982) (codified in 42 U.S.C.
§1973 (1981, Supp. 1994)).
56. Exec. Order No. 8802, 6 F.R. 3109 (1941) (President Roosevelt outlawing racial discrim-
ination in industries that were part of the war effort); Exec. Order No. 10925, 26 F.R. 1977
(1961) (President Kennedy outlawing discrimination among government contractors); Exec.
Order No. 11246, 30 F.R. 12319 (1965), as amended by Exec. Order No. 11375, 32 F.R. 14303
(1967) (President Johnson requiring federal contractors to engage in affirmative action); Exec.
Order No. 11478, 34 F.R. 12985 (1969) (President Nixon requiring affirmative action programs
in federal employment). See James E. Jones, The Rise and Fall of Affirmative Action, RACE IN
AMERICA: THE STRUGGLE FOR EQUALITY 351 (Herbert Hill & James E. Jones, Jr. eds., 1993)
(noting that every President since Roosevelt, including the current one, has either issued his
own executive order attacking racial discrimination or continued the order in effect when he
was elected).
57. See A. Leon Higginbotham, Jr., F. Michael Higginbotham, & S. Sandile Ngcobo, De
lure Housing Segregation in the United States and South Africa: The Difficult Pursuit For Racial
Justice, 1990 U. ILL. L. REV. 763, 767-69. The authors argue persuasively that the Court's will-
ingness to make racial oppressors take a more difficult course can have consequences that
could ameliorate the impact of oppression. They show that, in contrast to what happened in
South Africa, the U.S. Supreme Court in modest ways slowed down racial oppression.
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Act of 1964 so that it cannot address problems regarding the number of
black people hired. She was instrumental in pushing the Court to find that a
comparison of the percentage of nonwhite workers in jobs classified as
skilled or unskilled does not make out a prima facie disparate impact case
in Wards Cove Packing v. Atonio." She has been an instrumental vote in lim-
iting the ability of government to question the appropriateness of the private
sector use of race in decision-making. In St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks,"
the Court allowed an employer to escape liability for discrimination on
grounds that the defendants had not articulated-and in some ways had
denied by asserting the opposite position. In City of Richmond v. J.A.
Croson, Justice O'Connor refuses to allow the former capital of the Confed-
eracy to attempt to alter a racial status quo where there are essentially no
black contractors employed. She suggests that any problems created by a
lack of black contractors can be solved by racially neutral proposals, but
ignores the extent to which such racial neutrality cannot provide a real alter-
native for racial change." In Shaw v. Reno,62 however, Justice O'Connor
goes further and clearly demonstrates the extent to which she is committed
to a restricted and oppressive racial present-she permits white plaintiffs to
claim a constitutional harm when no black plaintiff could do so. She is
joined by Justice Scalia and Chief Justice Rehnquist,' who have argued
elsewhere that, when raised by groups other than white Americans, such
harms cannot be a violation of equal protection." Justice O'Connor has cre-
58. 490 U.S. 642, 656 (1989). This was partially overruled in the 1991 Civil Rights Act.
Pub. L. 102-166 (1991) (noting that one purpose of the 1991 Act is to codify judicial
interpretations of Title VII contained in Griggs v. Duke Power Co. and other decisions prior to
Wards Cove).
59. 113 S. Ct. 2742 (1993) (holding that a judicial fact-finder could conclude that the black
employee's discharge at issue was the result of personal bias despite the fact first, that the
supervisor had testified that he had no personal bias, and second, that the employer had
never argued that there was personal bias involved).
60. 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
61. See Culp, Intersectionality of Oppression, supra note 19.
62. 113 S.Ct. 2816 (1993).
63. Id.
64. See, e.g., J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 114 S.Ct. 1419, 1436-37 (1994) (Scalia, J. dissent-
ing, joined by Rehnquist, C.J. and Thomas, J.).
Of course the relationship of sex to partiality would have been relevant if the
Court had demanded in this case what it ordinarily demands: that the complaining
party have suffered some injury .... [Tihe defendant would have some excuse to
complain about the prosecutor's striking male jurors if male jurors tend to be more
favorable towards defendants in paternity suits. But if men and women jurors are
(as the Court thinks) fungible, then the only arguable injury from the prosecutor's
"impermissible" use of male sex as the basis for his peremptories is injury to the
stricken juror, not to the defendant ...
The core of the Court's reasoning is that peremptory challenges on the basis
of any group characteristic subject to heightened scrutiny are inconsistent with the
guarantee of the Equal Protection Clause. That conclusion can be reached only by focus-
ing unrealistically upon individual exercises of peremptory challenge, and ignoring the totali-
ty of the practice. Since all groups are subject to the peremptory challenge (and will be
made the object of it, depending upon the nature of the particular case) it is hard to see
how any group is denied equal protection.
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ated a racially political present in which the interests of black people are
outside the possibility of change.
It is difficult to see from where change could come in the racial status
quo that Justice O'Connor has attempted to create: state and local govern-
ments can only do something if they meet an impossible standard; the feder-
al government is similarly severely limited in its ability to do anything. In
addition, Justice O'Connor has been a swing vote saying that, no matter how
egregious, the interests of black victims of official police oppression or pun-
ishment are not issues that constitutionally trouble the Court.' She seems
not to understand that such decisions reinforce racial stereotypes and are
part of the racial oppression of black people.
Is Justice O'Connor a bad person? No. I think she means well, but she
has not understood the extent to which the racial status quo is inappropriate
and that, even if she does not want to alter it, if she will not permit others
to do so, she becomes an unseen but important enforcer of that racial status
quo. To borrow a phrase from the second Justice Harlan, the Court becomes
the "fist inside the velvet glove," hiding its endorsement and enforcement of
a racially restricted present behind words of sympathy and inaction, but all
the time reminding the citizens that some form of the racial status quo is
required." My fear is not that you will join all of the positions advocated
by Justice O'Connor, or that any one decision taken separately is dangerous,
but instead that, in a different way, you will assume that the status quo is
appropriate or that what works as a remedy for white middle class women
will work for black men and black women. You may be right that, in fact, a
middle course is the only effective avenue for change coming from the
courts, but your role as a judicial voice requires that you permit other per-
spectives to be heard. Hear the voices to whom this Court-led significantly
by Justice O'Connor-have not given an effective audience.
IV. CONCLUSION
You commented at your swearing in:
This weekend, I attended a celebration of women lawyers in New York. The
keynote speaker was our grand Attorney General, Janet Reno. It may have
been the best-attended. It was certainly the most remarkable event at the
American Bar Association's annual meeting. Awards were made in the name
of Margaret Brent, a great lady of the mid-1600s, celebrated as the first
woman lawyer in America. Her position as a woman, yet a possessor of
Id. (emphases added). Justice Scalia's argument, if applied to re-districting, should have pre-
vented him from finding harm to five white plaintiffs in Shaw v. Reno.
65. See Bostick v. Florida, 501 U.S. 429 (1991). Further, she voted with the majority in
McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987).
66. Justice Harlan originally used the phrase in the context of management-union relations
during labor disputes:
The danger inherent in well-timed increases in benefits is the suggestion of a fist
inside the velvet glove. Employees are not likely to miss the inference that the
source of benefits now conferred is also the source from which future benefits must
flow and which may dry up if it is not obliged.
N.L.R.B. v. Exchange Parts Co., 375 U.S. 405, 409 (1963).
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power, so confused her contemporaries that she was sometimes named in
court records not as Mistress Margaret Brent, but as Gentleman Margaret
Brent. [Laughs] Times are changing. The president made that clear by ap-
pointing me, and just last week, naming five other women to Article III
courts. Six of his total of fourteen federal bench nominees thus far are wom-
en. Justice Sandra Day O'Connor recently quoted Oklahoma Supreme Court
Justice Jeanne Coyne who was asked, 'Do women judges decide cases differ-
ently by virtue of being women?' Justice Coyne replied that in her experi-
ence, 'a wise old man and a wise old woman reached the same conclusion.'
[Laughs] I agree, but I also have no doubt that women, like persons of different
racial groups and ethnic origins, contribute what a fine jurist, the late Fifth Circuit
Judge, Alvin Rubin, described as a 'distinctive medley of views influenced by differ-
ences in biology, cultural impact and life experience.' A system of justice will be the
richer for diversity of background and experience. It will be the poorer in terms of
appreciating what is at stake and the impact of its judgments if all of its members
are cast from the same mold. I was impressed by the description of women at
the bar by one of the 1993 Margaret Brent Prize recipients, Esther Rothstein,
an attorney in private practice in Chicago. Esther said she found women
attorneys to be 'tough, yet tender, wanting to win but not vindictive, cau-
tiously optimistic with the sense to settle for victories that do not leave
one's opponent bloodied and bowed, willing to be a link in a chain that is
strong yet pliable.' In my lifetime, I expect there will be among federal judi-
cial nominees, based on the excellence of their qualifications, as many sisters
as 'brothers-in-law.' [Applause] That prospect is, indeed, cause for hope, and
its realization will be cause for celebration. Thank you. [Applause]67
It had been my hope that when a Democrat was in the White House, I
would know and respect the persons appointed to the Supreme Court. In
this, your appointment to the Supreme Court, at least, I have not been dis-
appointed by the Clinton Administration. I cannot claim you as a dear
friend,' but we have friends in common. You were one of the mentors of
my friend and former colleague Nadine Taub. Professor Taub has spoken of
your help to her in entering teaching and continuing the work in women's
rights that you helped to begin at Rutgers Law School in Newark. I, too,
began my law school teaching career at Rutgers Law School in Newark with
a number of your former colleagues.69 Ten years ago you participated in a
conference that I helped to organize and sponsor on the Twentieth Anniver-
sary of the 1964 Civil Rights Act at Rutgers, and I can still remember the
tremendously powerful history you told of gender discrimination in the
Academy. I was honored that you would come to our conference, and I can
still remember walking you and Judge Nathaniel Jones to the taxicab at the
end of the conference, and the real hug of camaraderie you gave to Judge
Jones.' I saw you then and I still see you as an important participant in
67. Ruth Bader Ginsburg Sworn In as Supreme Court Justice, supra note 6.
68. You are one of the judges that I send my reprints to, and you have over the years
been kind enough to acknowledge receipt of them.
69. Indeed, though she may not remember it, I showed your daughter around Harvard
Law School when she came as a prospective student because we shared common friends. I
can still remember the excitement that I got from meeting your daughter, because, even then,
more than fifteen years ago, you were a heroine of mine.
70. Judge Nathaniel Jones, also a participant in the Rutgers conference, was a former
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the struggle for civil rights and as a bona fide American heroine. Your selec-
tion to the Court was welcomed not for simply making the court look more
like America, both in terms of gender and religion, but also for appointing a
true participant in the civil rights movement to the Court. This is a Court
that truly needs some sense of the history of struggle and change if it is to
address the problems the Court will face in the next century. I honor your
past, and I welcome you to the Court. I hope that my strong criticism of
Justice O'Connor and the other Justices of the Court is not seen as personal
character indictments or as outside the permissible range of criticism, but in-
stead as pointed comments on the substance of their opinions and their ju-
risprudence as a whole.
Of course, if this was all I had to write to you, I could have sent a
private letter. You raised the issue of gender and race in your swearing in
ceremony. I believe that you would like to bring a significantly different
medley, indeed a distinctively different medley to the Court's conversations.
I write this to remind you that many perspectives are not now heard by the
Court. This is the most conservative Court on race in over one hundred
years. Justice Clarence Thomas's votes in Hicks71 and Shaw v. Reno' prove
that he is not truly a judicial conservative-as former Chair of the EEOC he
cannot have been confused by the controversy in Burdine"3 or have mistaken
the Congress's intent to enact the interpretation of the dissenters in
Hicks74-but is instead a supporter of the racial status quo. The point is that
racial or gender diversity on the Court does not mean that the distinctive
voices and concerns that ought to be heard in the Court will be given a
chance. In particular, given the way a number of your colleagues choose
their clerks from a limited political perspective, there is a real chance that
general counsel of the NAACP and the NAACP Special Contribution Fund and is now a
Circuit Judge on the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit. I had the honor of
clerking for him in 1979-80. Judge Jones was the third African American to serve on the Sixth
Circuit.
71. 113 S.Ct. 2742 (1993).
72. 113 S.Ct. 2816, supra note 19.
73. Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (1981).
74. Burdine held that the burden of proof is always on the plaintiff in a Title VII suit-all
that is required of a defendant employer is the articulation of an explanation for the allegedly
discriminatory action. Hicks goes further and says that even if the defendant employer does
not articulate a persuasive justification, they still may win if the court believes that some
other reason "might" have been the cause of the employment action.
Justice Thomas' votes in Shaw v. Reno, 113 S.Ct. 2816 (1993) and Presley v. Etowah
County Commission, 112 S.Ct. 820 (1992), are inconsistent even for a judicial conservative.
Shaw reaches out to require race neutrality when it does not exist and Presley ignores the
nonexistence of racial neutrality when there is statutory and constitutional support to find a
real injury. It seems to me that a judicial conservative might rule for plaintiffs in both cases,
but to rule for the plaintiff in one and not the other shows not judicial conservatism, but
support for the racial status quo that conservatism cannot require.
Conservative Justices in a number of rulings have limited the plaintiff's right to seek
recovery in situations where "real" injury occurs. See Village of Arlington Heights v. Metro-
politan Housing Development Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977). Shaw is inconsistent with this line of
cases and there is no reason for a "conservative" to see differently. At a minimum it might
be reasonable to expect Justice Thomas to explain his inconsistency.
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important issues involving race and class will not be discussed and unim-
portant issues will dominate. I want to emphasize to you that understanding
the impact of gender oppression does not mean that you will understand
racial oppression. I believe that you will champion those concerns that you
think are important, and I, as one member of the Academy, want to chal-
lenge you to hear the unspoken voices of racial oppression in your delibera-
tions, voices that many of your colleagues cannot and do not desire to hear.
To do that sometimes means not compromising on concerns fundamental to
the poor, to racial minorities, or to women. Sometimes justice requires a
Brown or a Roe to alter and structure our conversations. It is that difficult
task that I ask you to undertake.

